Returns on multipolarity

GLOBAL politics is hurtling towards a multipolar system the likes of which we haven’t seen since the late 20th century. Several indicators bear this out: the global hegemon for the past four decades, the US, is experiencing a decline in its ability and willingness to project power outwards, as seen in its continued failure in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf, and in the increased reluctance and reticence of its allies to pick up its slack. Much of this decline stems from internal structural pressures: destabilising inequality, lopsided growth and investment confined to finance and IT, polarised elite factionalism, and a turn to racist nativism and insularity as the response to these problems.

In the rest of the world, China’s stature as the premier industrial power remains uncontested, and its role as a provider of military prowess is growing rapidly. Coupled with Chinese liquidity generating debt and investment-based infrastructure partnerships in many parts of the world, the demand for foreign patronage and support is being met by a new supplier.

Lastly, the institutional structures that generated order under unipolarity are themselves being hollowed out. Free trade stands abandoned by its erstwhile promoter, the US. There is increased scepticism around the strings that come with World Bank and IMF lending, and the UN along with any moral notion of international law was rendered thoroughly redundant during the livestreamed genocide in Gaza. The last pillar standing is the US dollar as the world’s currency but its role may diminish as currency-swap arrangements grow in popularity.

What do these global transformations mean for countries like Pakistan? Subordinate within the existing global political system, does a new multipolar moment, especially one whose structures and norms are as yet unclear, signal prospects for positive change? To answer this question, one must hold a clear understanding of what positive change looks like in practice. To me, at least, this means a sustainable improvement in Pakistan’s long-standing domestic sociopolitical and economic issues.

In the current moment, emerging multipolarity is actually strengthening the status quo in both politics and economics.

These issues are first, a dysfunctional economic system that is unable to generate an aggregate increase in total output without breaking down; nor is it able to improve productivity levels relative to comparator countries; nor is it capable of meeting basic subsistence requirements of more than a third of its population (let alone the material aspirations of the rest).

Second, a formal political system that currently offers little room for actual politics and claim-making, stifled as it is at the very top by a security-dominated structure, and at all levels by extreme levels of executive control, including on the judiciary. As a result, avenues for raising demands and seeking redress at any level of government are non-existent, with the costs of rule by diktat suffered most frequently by marginalised groups.

And third, the issue of inequality between different ethno-linguistic groups, mapping onto variations in development across Pakistan’s geography. The political outcome of this inequality ranges from intra-province conflicts in Sindh, to bolstering secessionism in Balochistan and insurgencies along the border with Afghanistan.

So to reiterate the question, can global multipolarity offer prospects for improvement in Pakistan alongside these three contradictions (economic dysfunction, political suppression and inter-community conflict)?

Some observers argue that a multipolar world allows countries like Pakistan to play off superpowers against each other and extract better deals for themselves. That once the constraints of the current neoliberal world order wither away, economic policymaking can finally escape the prescription of creditors such as the IMF to unlock greater prosperity. That in the absence of active meddling by an imperial hegemon, domestic politics will reflect popular sentiment and desires more actively.

These beliefs had merit at the dawn of the last multipolar moment after World War II, and they are not without logic today. But as the experience of new states in the aftermath of decolonisation revealed then, the domestic implications of the geopolitical order are shaped first and foremost by domestic politics. And given current patterns of domestic politics in Pakistan, the prospects of tangible improvement across those three key issues remain dim.

In the current moment, emerging multipolarity is actually strengthening the status quo in both politics and economics. On the political front, it is through the emboldening and empowerment of hybrid regime structures at the expense of democracy. The credible role played by the military establishment and its civilian front in mediating the war on Iran through a network of ties across the US, Iran, the Gulf and China has increased its indispensability on the global front while cementing its position in office domestically. As a consequence, there is greater brazenness in the actions of the executive, visible in evictions of working class households in Islamabad, control over the judiciary, or in the continued denial of space to both ethnic and mainstream political opposition.

On the economic front, increased political relevance globally offers the prospect of unearned foreign liquidity and concessional finance, reducing any incentive to fix domestic productivity. The IMF continues to play along, China remains a reliable provider of military support, and Saudi Arabia has stepped in to fill the gap left by departing Emirati deposits. Beyond crisis management, there is little resembling a plan for economic rejuvenation, and in any case, a volatile neighbourhood with increased risks across the eastern and western borders provides ample justification for a security-first approach to governance.

At this admittedly early stage of a changing world order, multipolarity is cementing domestic tendencies that already prevail. The status quo, along with the economic interests aligned with it, will continue to navigate geopolitics in ways that serve regime consolidation rather than broad-based development. For that calculus to change, the three issues/ contradictions identified above would need to become the organising basis of a political challenge capable of compelling a renegotiation of state-society relations. That is a high bar. But it is the only honest answer to the question of what multipolarity can offer a country like Pakistan. The world can change its architecture without changing who benefits inside Pakistan’s borders. That part remains entirely a domestic problem and a domestic responsibility.

The writer teaches sociology at Lums.

X: @umairjav

Published in Dawn, May 11th, 2026